It’s not the end of the road if all EU members cannot agree on a common position for a formal document. If one, two or three governments refuse to agree with this common position, the other countries can simply submit or publish the statement as individual governments, instead of the EU as a whole. The general effect of putting some pressure on China will be similar. Another simple solution is for the President of the Commission or the European Council to criticize an action, maybe even during a trip to Beijing or at least in an op-ed or an interview, and the symbolic impact would be similar. High Representative Josep Borrell has become more freewheeling in discussing and criticizing China in non-formal settings, like op-eds or interviews, generating headlines about how the EU wants to get tougher on China every time (regardless of the fact that these were just his personal opinions, instead of a common agreement between all 27 national governments). No national government will ever ask for the removal of an important EU leader simply for comments they made on China, yet they will create the impression that the EU is taking a stand.
The obsession with unity ignores all the ways the EU and national governments can act towards China, without every single member state coming on board. All is needed is some creativity and some courage to take the initiative. If the EU is to adopt a coherent, goal-driven, long-term strategy towards China, it should be clear that some member states will simply have a different perspective than the majority. In this context, there are two options: either dilute the strategy so that every member state agrees, even if this means it’s no longer a coherent strategy, or simply implement the strategy without the dissenting governments. The EU lacks many of the powers that national governments normally have, so the policies of national governments are more important. Yet most power, whether economic, diplomatic or military, is in the hands of just over a dozen governments. If they can coordinate their China strategies, the impact of their actions will be very similar to a unified EU approach.
If Huawei builds the 5G networks of only a few member states, if a few governments continue to fervently court Chinese investments or refuse to criticize human rights abuses in China, if some countries allow Chinese companies to manage ports, build highways or buy local companies, or if China can influence the decisions of a few European governments, that’s largely irrelevant in the grand geopolitical landscape, as long as all the other EU countries are united and act decisively. That is what matters: that most European countries work in concert and implement a coherent strategy towards a certain end goal.
Thus, it’s more about designing a common China strategy of most European governments, than a EU strategy itself. Stubbornly striving for consensus would simply dilute European policy toward China. If Europe lets itself driven by the view that “neither the EU nor any of its member states can effectively achieve their aims with China without full unity”, then any strategy on China is already failed. A coherent, goal-driven, long-term strategy to which only 20 EU members adhere to the letter is better than a hodgepodge supported by all.
Once we accept the reality that not everybody will get on board with a unified China strategy, the EU can act to reduce the negative impact of this division. One example is the problem of Huawei 5G gear. It was clear that there is no European consensus on this issue – some wanted to allow Huawei full access, others to ban it. In this context, the big players and EU officials themselves could have tried to find the best solution possible: EU governments should have discussed among themselves to create a larger group that adheres to a common position, for example rejecting an outright ban on Huawei, but quietly leaving it out of the 5G market in favor of Nokia and Ericsson, or banning it from the core network. If the heads of state or government of these countries announced this policy together, it would have provided cover for smaller EU countries to implement it without the same fear of being singled out and punished by Beijing (or by Washington).