Firstly, a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs will have to be negotiated. This freeze allows Kim Jong-un to maintain the deterrent he values so much, while assuring that the intentions of the North are peaceful and further developments are deemed unnecessary. There are many things that the US can afford to offer for this freeze. Economic aid and partial lifting of sanctions are the first to come to mind. North Korea is likely to accept such a deal, since Kim has focused his attention to economic growth, aiming to improve the standard of life in the North. Additionally, even the model of a double-freeze (that is, a nuclear freeze on North Korea for a freeze in US-ROK military exercises), as proposed by Russia and China, can be made to work, since it poses little to no danger to regional stability. The United States will still maintain military forces in the South, and the South Korean forces are better prepared, better equipped and benefit from great defensive capabilities. There is no question that the balance of power will remain strongly in favor of the US-ROK alliance, rendering any potential attack from the North a suicidal mission.

Secondly, economic cooperation with the North should become the main tool of the policy, implemented by both the US and South Korea. This economic cooperation should include aid, joint economic projects and touristic activities. North Korea has an obvious interest in accepting those, as it is a country that barely gets by in terms of economic activities. Furthermore, the US should look into the light-water reactors promised as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, as a tool for convincing North Korea that further developing its nuclear program is really of no use, while also pre-empting any possible rhetoric of energy needs coming from Pyongyang. With time passing, a total lifting of international sanctions can be discussed as a further reward of the North’s good behavior.

Thirdly, political communication should be set up, as there is a need to engage the North politically to reduce tensions and misunderstanding which can’t only be catered to by economic activities. There should be a permanent form of communication between the North and the United States, where the two can discuss issues at hand as to avoid any miscalculation. Dialogue in this form also serves in attesting to the North that the US is true to its promise of not searching to undermine the regime, therefore indirectly also addressing the security dilemma that Kim Jong-un has in the status quo.

Lastly, such a policy needs to embody willingness and patience, as it is a draft of a long-term taming rather than a short-term patching. The US needs to understand that setting up forms of communication with the North will require compromises and will represent a hardship in diplomacy and negotiations. There is no doubt that the North will maintain its bad-track record, at least initially. In the perception of North Korea, engaging in low-level provocative acts, which have happened before (be it in the form of an island shelling or a land-mine explosion), serves as a test of intention and willingness of the international community. In this light, closing all channels of interaction due to a single provocation would only confirm to Kim Jong-un that the West is really after him, having no intention what-so-ever to negotiate and only looking for reasons to punish him and his country. It doesn’t mean that such a policy dictates closing an eye to challenges coming from the North, but it does mean that a proportional response needs to be found in order to avoid wiping out in one stroke all the progress that would have been achieved.