The EU Needs but Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy on China

Since 2019, relations between the European Union (EU) and China have been seen through the lens of the partner-rival trope, going through moments of cooperation and periods of tensions and distancing. Over the past years, the EU has tried to articulate new policies and approaches towards China, yet they did not reach the level of a comprehensive long-term strategy. This search evolved along with EU-China relations, going through different phases and approaches.

Retracing the history of EU-China relations

For almost four decades starting in the 1980s, relations between China and the EU and its Member States developed based on growing economic ties – the EU became one of the most important markets for Chinese exports, while China became the new holy land of cheap workforce and factories for many European companies. Throughout this period, the EU and China mostly focused on the positive aspects of their relations and saw their economies largely as complementary. Tensions stemming from political, geopolitical and human rights issues still appeared from time to time, but their impact on the wider relationship was largely contained because of a desire to protect economic ties. Things began to change in the 2010s, when economic tensions became more prominent. As China climbed along the value chain, it emerged as an economic competitor of Europe. In 2013, disagreements cause by cheap solar panels produced in China led to EU threats to impose anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels, though the issue was eventually dealt with. Later, in 2016, after the high-tech German company Kuka was acquired by the Chinese Midea, generating fears that China could take over its know-how, the EU was awakened from what would be termed its naïveté in relation to China. Combined with the Made in China 2025 programme and the long-standing requirement for EU companies in China to establish joint ventures, becoming targets of forced technology transfers, the EU understood that China is not just an economic partner, but more of an economic competitor. EU-China relations were also affected by China’s increased assertiveness aboard and authoritarianism at home over the last decade. Human rights violations in China, especially in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, the centralisation of power under Xi Jinping and the increased role played by the Chinese Communist Party in society and the economy, tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the trend of “wolf-warrior diplomacy”, and China’s more prominent role on the international stage, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative, all emerged as issues in EU-China relations. In a geopolitical and international environment defined by growing tensions between China and the United States (US) and the emergence of US- China great power competition, Europe also began seeing China in a different light. Thus, from a former partner, the EU began defining China as a systemic rival, which would become a central characteristic of bilateral relations. […]

To have or not to have a China strategy

As we argued in our recent study for the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, “EU-China relations: De-risking or de-coupling − the future of the EU strategy towards China”, the EU lacks a strategy and none of the above initiatives are really a strategy. To start the argument with the basics, the definition of a strategy tells us that it should be a plan to achieve something – ideally, a long-term end goal. From this simple definition, all the above-mentioned approaches lack such a goal. Even more, they do not really address how the EU should achieve such goals.

The 2019 Strategic Outlook is mainly seen as the EU’s China strategy through the prism of its triptych. But this “partner, competitor, rival” narrative is just a description of the current state of EU-China relations – there is nothing strategic about it. The 10 actions contained within the Joint Communication presented a road map for the EU for the next few years, but they did not stem from a strategic vision that articulated a goal, being presented as separate actions. Furthermore, as previously explained, most of these actions have either been implemented or adopted, so they are no longer relevant for defining the future of the EU’s approach towards China.

When it comes to de-risking, while it can be seen as a country-agnostic economic strategy, it is not a China strategy. De-risking does not present any guidelines or goals about how to deal with China in areas such as geopolitics, the risk of military conflicts, the international stage and preserving the global order, or how to work with China to solve global issues. It addresses only economic and technological issues, without yet articulating how to achieve the goal of reducing the risks posed by external dependencies of the Union, which go beyond China.

Thus, for the moment, the EU lacks a comprehensive China strategy that could help better articulate and implement its policies in relations to China. In its absence, the EU’s measures until now have mainly been defensive, dealing with issues as they arise – like the case of the Commission’s investigation of Chinese electric vehicles, once imports of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in Europe started increasing.

The absence of a strategy is also caused by the lack of unity among EU Member States, which has been a problem frequently highlighted in recent years. Nonetheless, in our study, we argue that the Union’s main issue is the lack of a comprehensive and consistent long-term strategy and the focus on consensus among all 27 Member States undermines the emergence of such a strategy. In most topics or issues connected to China, a majority of Member States, as long as it includes the EU’s largest economies, could effectively implement a strategy through coordinated actions taken at national level, with input from the Commission and the EP. The active role taken by the Commission regarding China in recent years, as shown by the numerous investigations underway (regarding subsidised Chinese EVs, solar panels and wind turbines, or regarding procurement of medical devices in China), shows that action is possible even while lacking full unity. If the EU can adopt a larger, comprehensive vision and then a strategy regarding China based on it, various European stakeholders working together can then implement that strategy successfully, even if not perfectly.

Today, unfortunately, the EU lacks such a comprehensive China strategy as the focus is largely on economics and of a defensive nature, namely de-risking and achieving reciprocity by raising various barriers meant to protect the EU from unfair competition from China.

On this, there is a high degree of agreement among European stakeholders, even if not full unity.

Disclaimer: This article is based on the Study “EU-China relations: De-risking or de-coupling − the future of the EU strategy towards China” supported by the European Parliament and implemented under TEPSA’s umbrella. The other co-authors of the study were Una Aleksandra BĒRZIŅA-ČERENKOVA, Philippe LE CORRE, John SEAMAN, Richard TURCSÁNYI and Stefan VLADISAVLJEV.

The full article can be read on TEPSA’s website.

Photo Credits: Flickr/European Council President

China, China-European Union, The European Union

Andreea Brinza

Andreea Brinza is a researcher and the Vice President of RISAP. Her interests are related to the geopolitics, geostrategy and geoeconomics of the Asia-Pacific region and especially China. Her research focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative.