Looking back, the first Trump administration might have been just a demo for the European Union and transatlantic relations, with the worse yet to come. Still combining a feverish passion for tariffs with distrust of the EU, U.S. President Donald Trump now also brings a desire for the territory of an EU member state and little interest in Europe’s vital security interests regarding Ukraine. 

In this new period of geopolitical turmoil, what will China do?

China has often been depicted as implementing a “divide-and-rule” policy regarding the EU. While this desire to divide member states might have existed, as China worked intently to improve its bilateral relations with different EU member states, in reality, China lacked a clear vision regarding the EU and a workable strategy to achieve its goals. Contrary to the oft-held perception of the Chinese government as a long-term actor with a “hundred year” plan, in the EU, at least, China operated largely from an improvised playbook. 

Many of Beijing’s actions regarding Europe were not proactive moves to shape the geopolitical environment, but came as arrogant or angry responses to EU actions (like the sanctions on European Parliament bodies and members), the actions of individual EU countries (such as Lithuania’s opening of a Taiwan trade office) or simple attempts to take advantage of various opportunities that appeared (for example, consolidating political relations with Slovakia only because of Robert Fico’s openness toward China). 

Even in Hungary, China’s best friend in the EU, Beijing either lacked or failed to implement a coherent strategy. Only recently did China infuse a large amount of money into different projects, after almost a decade of waiting with minimal economic activity. Until last year, China-Hungary relations operated more on fancy narratives and promises than on tangible results. The close ties survived thanks to Viktor Orban’s interests, not Beijing’s farsightedness.

Now that EU-U.S. relations may be shaken by the new Trump administration, China should renounce its haphazard approach and should come up with a real – and workable – strategy for the EU. The first Trump administration presented a golden opportunity for China-EU relations, when the initial trade wars could have led to closer relations between the two victims of Trump’s tariffs. While this doesn’t often happen in international relations, China has now received a second chance to capitalize on U.S. mistakes and rekindle relations with Europe.

To do this, the first step would be to formulate a playbook tailored to the interests of each EU member state, avoiding past mistakes – like Beijing treating most or all Eastern European member states as identical within the framework of its China-CEE platform. While the new leaders of EU institutions seem more reticent in engaging with China, many national leaders are more open to dealing with it, motivated by economic or political interests. Thus, China has opportunities in different EU member states that it can use as a springboard, even though the broader EU environment remains less favorable for now.

The second step would be for China to lessen its knee-jerk approach to foreign policy. The sanctions imposed on some EU bodies and politicians epitomize this problem. The sanctions’ only purpose was taking revenge after feeling insulted, and they have only been detrimental for China – not least by undermining its chances of concluding a long-sought-after bilateral investment deal with the EU.

The third step is connected, as it pertains to present or future disagreements. China should take a more flexible and accommodating approach regarding the current and future EU tariffs on Chinese companies. Europe is afraid for its industrial and economic future, and tariffs are now seen as a vital tool for its economic defense, something Beijing could relate to. In order to avoid spiraling trade wars, China should be more flexible in negotiating with the EU and should concede on some EU requests to preserve political trust, even if it comes at the cost of some tariffs.

The fourth step will be for China to get involved in the Ukraine peace efforts as a neutral, trustworthy partner. If Beijing manages to use its influence over Russia to bring it to the negotiating table, China has a lot to gain. Not only will it show its role as a premier power on the world stage and win plaudits as a peacemaker – a narrative that China has constantly promoted over the years – but its relations with the EU will improve, as it will gain goodwill. In an era when Trump might threaten EU countries with a U.S. withdrawal from NATO, the absence of a war on the EU borders will give the Union greater leverage in dealing with the United States. Moreover, if China can display influence over Russia, it could generate greater trust and better relations with countries in the EU’s eastern half, which are afraid of possible Russian aggression.

Finally, China could take advantage of Trump’s aggressive stance regarding Greenland to signal support for the EU by engaging more intensely with Denmark. For example, if Xi Jinping were to undertake an official visit to Denmark in order to improve bilateral relations, even without mentioning Greenland, it would be read as a show of support for Copenhagen and for the EU in general. Combined with peace efforts in Ukraine, China could present itself as a supporter of EU territorial integrity and security.

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This article has been previously published in The Diplomat. You can read the article on The Diplomat’s website.